Federal Rulesof Criminal Procedure- Rule 16, Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments- Use of Protective Orders as a Safeguard in Broadened Criminal Discivery by Editors,
COMMENTS
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RuLE 16,
SEo0ND PRELImiNARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS-USE OF
PROTECTIVE ORDERS AS A SAFEGUARD IN BROADENED CRIMINAL,
DIScovERY
The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States is presently considering a second pre-
liminary draft of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which would expand Rule 16 to provide for broader pretrial
discovery in criminal cases." Under the existing rule a court may permit
a defendant to inspect and copy only designated documents and objects
"obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by
seizure or process." 2 The proposed rule would permit the court to allow
discovery of all books, papers, documents or tangible objects in the pos-
session of the Government, 3 including any confessions or statements which
a defendant has made to the Government, any reports of relevant exami-
nations or scientific tests, and defendant's recorded testimony before a
grand jury4 The proposed rule specifically excludes discovery of docu-
ments prepared by government agents and statements made by government
witnesses 5 except as provided in the Jencks Act.6  Furthermore, no pro-
vision is made for discovery of lists of possible government witnesses.
While the proposed liberalization of the federal criminal discovery
rules follows the recent trend of thinking of certain courts 7 and commen-
tators 8 that evidence and other information necessary for a proper defense
'FED. R. ClM. P. 16, Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
(March 1964) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rule 16].
2 FED. R. CRM. P. 16. The defendant must show "that the items sought may be
material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable." Ibid.
3 Proposed Rule 16(b). Specific designation by defendant of the items sought is
not required, but the requirements of reasonableness and materiality are retained.
Ibid.
4 Proposed Rule 16(a).
5 Proposed Rule 16(b).
6 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958). The Jencks Act provides, inter alia, that statements
or reports to government agents made by witnesses or prospective witnesses (other
than defendant) cannot be subject to subpoena, discovery, or inspection until the
witness in question has testified on direct examination at trial. For discussion of
whether the application of this act should be limited to instances where defendant
seeks the statements for purposes of impeachment rather than for positive evidence,
see note 42 infra and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 335 P.2d 114 (1959); State v.
Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958). See generally Fletcher, Pretrial Discovey
in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1960).
S See, e.g., Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution--Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 279; Symposium-Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases,
33 F.R.D. 47-128 (1964).
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be made available to criminal defendants, 9 it is generally recognized that
safeguards must exist to protect the interests of the Government and third
parties from dangers peculiarly inherent in criminal proceedings. The
dangers most commonly feared include (1) perjury and manufactured
evidence; (2) bribery or intimidation of prospective witnesses; (3) dis-
closure of government secrets; and (4) loss by the Government of strategic
advantage to an extent that would imperil the prosecution of justice in
criminal courts. 10
The most significant safeguard included in the proposed rule is the
provision, apparently carried over from the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure," granting the court discretion to issue protective orders denying,
deferring, or limiting discovery in any way appropriate, whenever "sufficient
showing" is made.12  This comment will consider to what extent the pro-
tective order concept is applicable to criminal discovery, how the concept
relates to the trial court's basic discretionary power in granting or denying
discovery, and the role that such a concept might play in the further ex-
pansion of discovery.
The primary function of the protective order in civil discovery is to
provide a means by which a person (whether litigant or third party) can
have a court rule on the propriety of an interrogatory or deposition request
which has not otherwise been subject to judicial supervision.' 3  The neces-
sity for a protective order provision is reduced where the initial granting
9 For a discussion of the degree to which discovery is constitutionally required
by due process, see notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) ; State
v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) (dictum). See generally
Fletcher, supra note 7, at 309-16. The danger of an increase in perjury resulting
from pretrial discovery cannot be evaluated satisfactorily because of the paucity of
experience or statistics in this area. See People v. Preston, 13 Misc. 2d 802, 176
N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228, 229 (1964). The same is apparently true with respect to attempts
by parties to tamper with witnesses. For an analysis of the strategic advantage argu-
ment, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1194 (1960).
"1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
12 Proposed Rule 16(e). The proposed rule, unlike Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 30(b), does not specify what considerations would be taken into account in
deciding whether a "sufficient showing" has been made, and thereby leaves the deter-
mination to the broad discretion of the court. The Advisory Committee's Note sug-
gests that relevant considerations include "the safety of witnesses and others, a
particular danger of perjury or witness intimidation, the protection of information
vital to the national security, and the protection of business enterprises from economic
reprisals." Such "showing" may be submitted in writing to the court in camera so
that the information contained will not be disclosed to defendant If discovery is denied
on the basis of this showing, the Government's statements may then be sealed and
made available to the appellate court if necessary. Ibid.
13 This opportunity is of great importance since civil discovery under the federal
rules is initiated and carried out by private parties, without the necessity of a court
order, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 27, 30, 31, and 33, and the motion for a protective order
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b) or (d) presents the only opportunity
which a court has to rule on whether discovery should be permitted and the way in
which it should be carried out. Judicial approval is required, however, to initiate
discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, which relates to documents and
objects, and 35, which relates to the physical and mental examination of persons and
contains its own equivalent of a protective order in subsection (b) (1).
of discovery is itself subject to judicial discretion, since the opposing party
will probably have had an opportunity to object at the hearing on the
discovery motion. 14 Even in such a case, however, a protective order
provision may be valuable because it sets out a definite procedure by which
discovery may be denied or modified in light of developments altering the
parties' respective positions.15 Thus the fact that discovery is subject to
court discretion, as is presently true of discovery in criminal cases,' 6 does
not in itself render provision for a protective order superfluous.
Similarly the difference in policy considerations behind the granting
or denial of discovery in civil and criminal cases does not automatically
rule out the use of protective orders in criminal discovery, although it
may indicate that protective orders are not adequate to bear the primary
burden of preventing harmful disclosures and should be regarded only as
supplemental to the protection afforded by initial court discretion in grant-
ing or denying discovery. While the ultimate aim of discovery in both
civil and criminal cases is the "quest for truth," civil discovery was specifi-
cally designed to aid private litigants in preparing cases before trial, to
reduce the time spent at trial (by uncovering the facts beforehand, thus
narrowing the issues to be litigated), and to facilitate pretrial settlement.1
7
Protective orders in the civil area, providing boundaries beyond which
the participants may not go in their pretrial endeavors, are thus designed
to prevent harassment, undue expense, or inconvenience to the persons
subject to discovery and the unnecessary or harmful disclosure of things
which the discovering party has no right to know.'8 Criminal discovery,
14 If the motion is granted ex parte or if reasons for denying discovery appear
only subsequently, he might oppose discovery by such other means as a motion for
rehearing, a motion to quash, or a petition for a writ of prohibition. For an example
of the use of a writ of prohibition to oppose discovery, see People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d
223, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16 (1963).
15 It was perhaps for such reasons that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34,
pertaining to discovery of documents and objects, was made subject to the rule 30(b)
protective order, even though discovery under rule 34 is obtainable only in the court's
discretion. The Advisory Committee Note to the 1948 amendment of rule 34, which
added the reference to rule 30(b), does not explain clearly the reasons for the change.
See 3A BARRoN & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE AND PRocEDURE 461 (Wright rev.
ed. 1958).
1 6 This, of course, does not prevent the prosecutor from voluntarily surrendering
information to the defense, in which case no protective order problem would generally
arise. In instances where third parties might be affected, however, it might be argued
that they should be given a protective order remedy to prevent harmful disclosures
not objected to by the prosecution.
17 See generally Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 41 MicH. L. REv. 205 (1942); Developments in the Law-Discovery,
74 HAav. L. REv. 940, 944-45 (1961) ; Note, 50 YALE L.J. 708, 712-13 (1941).
18 The basic policy behind protective orders in civil cases is indicated by the
wording of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b) which, in addition to granting the
court discretion to deny discovery, to limit its scope, or to change the place and manner
in which it is to be taken, provides that "the court may make any other order which
justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression." (Emphasis added.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d), in addition,
outlines the procedure by which a deposition may be terminated "upon a showing
that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably
to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party . . . :" See, e.g., Ful-Vue
Sales Co. v. American Optical Co., 11 F.R.D. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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on the other hand, is a far more solemn affair-the primary test of its
propriety being whether the accused's "due process" right to be provided
with evidence and other information necessary for a proper defense out-
weighs the dangers noted earlier. 19 Therefore, while civil protective orders
provide merely for the exceptions to an otherwise unlimited discovery, in
criminal cases the primary question is whether discovery should be per-
mitted at all. Thus it appears more appropriate to have discretion over
criminal discovery exercised by the court in the first instance than to rely
solely on the safeguard of a subsequent protective order.
The protective order in criminal cases appears, nevertheless, to have
value in expediting the determination of discovery questions, by providing
a definite procedure for resolving subsequent objections to disclosure and
details regarding the time and manner of discovery. Courts could grant
routine and relatively harmless types of discovery ex parte, with the knowl-
edge that a protective order was available to guard against any unforeseen
dangers. 0 Furthermore, for those types of discovery in which the danger
is usually minimal (for example, defendant's confessions and statements)
the protective order may even be a safeguard sufficient to make initial court
discretion unnecessary. 21
At the present time the granting of discovery motions in both state
and federal practice rests within the sound discretion of the trial court,
2 2
with the burden of proof on defendant as moving party.P Under present
rule 16 and proposed rule 16(b), pertaining to books, documents, and
tangible objects within the Government's possession, defendant has the
burden of showing that "the items sought may be material to preparation
of the defense and that the request is reasonable." However, for discovery
of items under proposed subsection (a), including defendant's own state-
ments to the Government and scientific reports, no showing of materiality
or reasonableness is required. Since trial court discretion has in the past
been delimited chiefly in these terms, the removal of this requirement on
subsection (a) items might appear to withdraw any trial court discretion
at this stage. Yet strictly speaking, since subsection (a) merely provides
that the court "may" order discovery, the rule still speaks in discretionary
terms; further, discovery of these items is subject to subsection (e) under
which the court "may" grant a protective order. This double grant of
discretion over subsection (a) items seems ambiguous and unnecessary since
the only showing which the court could consider in granting or denying dis-
19 See note 10 .rpra and accompanying text.
2 0 One remaining objection to granting discovery ex parte is the possibility that
the prosecution will be unduly burdened. Compare note 36 infra and accompanying
text.
21 See text accompanying notes 25-30 infra.
2 2 See United States v. Heath, 260 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Boyance, 215 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d
704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957) ; Glaros v. State, 223 Md. 272, 164 A.2d 461 (1960).
23 See United States v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421, 424 (D.C.N.Y. 1955) ; People v.
Maranian, 359 Mich. 361, 102 N.W.2d 568 (1960) ; State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181,
134 S.E.2d 334 (1964); 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 955(2) (c) at 796 (1961).
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covery would have to come under the motion for a protective order. Thus,
if no initial showing is to be required of defendant, the rule should provide
that such discovery be granted as a matter of right unless opposed by a
motion for a protective order.
This procedure seems correct as to defendant's confessions, statements,
and grand jury testimony since discovery of such items is often of great
importance to the defense 2 4 and presents minimal problems of abuse,
nothing being revealed except what the Government learned from the
defendant himself. The procedure also seems appropriate for reports
and results of medical examinations and scientific tests.20  It is perhaps
true that these are items unlimited discovery of which might effectively
destroy the Government's strategy and aid perjury, even though there is
no way for defendant to change their results, since advance knowledge
of what tests the Government plans to introduce may allow a perjurious
defendant or defense witness to alter his testimony in such a way as to
neutralize their damaging effect.2 7  But balanced against this possibility is
the fact that often a defendant may not know what actually occurred or
may be unable to duplicate the various tests essential to the case.as  A
showing of specific need should not therefore be required of a defendant,
since he may not be aware of all the scientific evidence against him.2 If
it is thus impossible for defendant to show materiality and reasonableness,
it would be best to grant discovery of these items also as a matter of right
subject only to protective orders.
In the discovery of other documents and tangible objects under sub-
section (b), the required showing of reasonableness and materiality is
24 Defendant may not have a clear recollection of what he said to the prosecution
or to government agents, and such statements may also be relevant to the questions
of defendant's mental state at the time of arrest and whether a confession was coerced.
See People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 335 P.2d 114 (1959) ; People v. Johnson, 356
Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739 (1959) ; State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
25 Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959) ; see Symposium
-Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47-128 (1964). An exception to
this may arise where the transcript of an interview with the defendant contains names
of third parties mentioned by the interrogator. Pursuant to a protective order,
however, such objectionable portions could easily be deleted by the court. More
serious problems are raised when subsection (a) items consist of government attorneys'
"work product" or otherwise fall under the terms of the Jencks Act. The proposed
rule ambiguously includes a restriction against such items in subsection (b) but not
in subsection (a). Confusion might also arise regarding the definition of defendant's
"statement," as it has in several Jencks Act cases. See, e.g., Campbell v. United
States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
26 These items might conceivably involve government "work product," internal
memoranda, and statements of witnesses to government agents immune under the
Jencks Act. Subsection (a) of the proposed rule fails to indicate how such problems
should be treated. See note 25 supra.
27 Such evidence could contradict defendant's version of the facts, but leave open
other alternative explanations, and pretrial discovery by a perjurious defendant might
enable him to fashion his testimony so as to account for this evidence without incrimi-
nating himself.
28 Defendant may lack financial resources, access to scientific laboratories, or it
may no longer be possible for the tests in question to be made. See State v. Thompson,
54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74
-Ahv. L. Ray. 940, 1061 (1961).
29 See Advisory Committee Note, Proposed Rule 16.
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retained, thus placing a greater burden on defendant.3 In this area it
would be unwise to allow discovery as a matter of right 31 since the impact
of discovery of items in this category may vary widely
32
Under the proposed amendments it appears likely that the Govern-
ment's opposition to discovery may be considered either at the same hearing
as the initial discovery motion, or at a separate protective order hearing
subsequent to the granting of the discovery motion. Since ordinarily the
burden of proof is on the moving party,n it might seem that such procedure
involves a burden of proof shifting from the defendant in showing ma-
teriality and reasonableness (when such is required) to the Government
in showing reasons why discovery would be harmful and a protective
order needed. Whether or not the courts would actually resort to the
use of this shifting burden, the proposed rule should make it clear that
such a result is not intended; for it is probable that, if strictly applied, the
balance of the burdens of proof would not accurately reflect the weight
which should be given either to defendant's need for discovery in some
cases or to the Government's need for nondisclosure in others. Rather,
what is needed in the granting of discovery and protective orders, and is
not clearly specified by the proposed rules, is a balancing of defendant's
particular need for the items sought against the particular probability
30 Under present rule 16 the factors considered by the courts in determining
reasonableness have included the scope and particularity of the request, whether the
items are obtainable by other means, and whether the request attempts to appropriate
government attorneys' work product. See United States v. Woodner, 24 F.R.D. 33,
35 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
S1This is because the abolition of the specific designation requirement in the
proposed rule allows defendant to describe the items sought in general terms, and the
showing of materiality and reasonableness thus helps the court determine the extent
to which the Government must search its files to meet defendant's legitimate needs.
See Advisory Committee Note, Proposed Rule 16.
32For example, such items might include government secrets and government
attorneys' work product. Secrets, however, might adequately be safeguarded by a
protective order since they could remain in the Government's possession while the
order was being sought Compare United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1952).
Allowing discovery of work product would often hamper government agents and
attorneys in the preparation of their case. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery-Dilemma
Real or Apparent, 49 CALiF. L. REv. 56, 91-92 (1961). Nevertheless, despite the
apparent restrictions of the Jencks Act, see discussion at note 42 infra and accom-
panying text, fairness requires that in some cases discovery of work product be
allowed upon a showing, as in civil cases, that discovery of a designated item material
to the case, is otherwise unavailable, and that the defendant will be unreasonably
handicapped in preparing his defense without it. See, e.g., United States v. 50.34
Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Naylor v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 10
F.R.D. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The burden of proof should be greater on a defendant
in this instance than when he is obtaining discovery orders for documents which are
not work product, but in accordance with the balancing-of-interests policy, an indigent
defendant might sometimes be allowed freer access to government work product than
a defendant with greater resources who can collect the desired information indepen-
dently. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959). Of course,
the Government could still oppose discovery of work product by means of protective
orders whenever necessary. However, in the civil area Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 512 (1947) indicates that the determination of whether work product is to be
disclosed under rule 34 should lie in the initial discretion of the court rather than in
a protective order.
33 See notes 22-23 vipra and accompanying text.
COMMENTS
and degree of abuse involved.3 4 Such balancing calls for a degree of trial
court discretion which would, in the granting of either motion, take into
consideration the entire context of the particular case.
Protective orders may provide an opportunity to permit criminal
defendants to obtain for their defense items discovery of which was hitherto
thought to be infeasible, by providing a more effective means of having
discovery denied or modified in specific instances, rather than requiring
that whole categories of items be excluded from defendant's reach. 5 How-
ever, it should be borne in mind that the success of the whole scheme
depends ultimately on the soundness of the court's discretion. If, for ex-
ample, a court, granted discovery carelessly relying on the protective order
safeguard, judicial duties would thereby be effectively delegated to the
prosecution.386
One class of items the discovery of which in criminal trials might raise
strenuous objections, no matter how able trial courts are deemed to be,
is the names and addresses of third-party witnesses. A defendant may
properly desire the names of all eye-witnesses, or those whom the prose-
cution intends to call at trial, to help build his own version of the facts
or to prepare effective impeachment. 37 The danger, however, is that a
witness will be bribed or intimidated before he is able to testify at trial
and that potential witnesses, knowing their identities or testimony will
be disclosed, will be reluctant to come forward with information.38 In
most cases it would be extremely difficult to determine in advance how
:4 Such a balancing of interests has been recommended by the Supreme Court
in regard to disclosure of the identity of informers. Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 62 (1957). The balancing of the interests of the party seeking discovery
and those of the party opposing it has been used in civil discovery. See, e.g., United
Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960) ; Eastern States Petro-
leum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 27 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
35 In addition to those items added by proposed rule 16, other types of criminal
discovery might include: identities of prospective government witnesses and eye-
witnesses, compare 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1958) (disclosure of government witnesses to
defendants charged with a capital offense at least three days before trial), and wit-
nesses' statements to government agents, see discussion regarding the Jencks Act at
note 42 infra and accompanying text; certain types of government work product, see
note 32 supra; the inspection of written or recorded statements of co-defendants in
a joint trial; provisions for written interrogatories and depositions; orders requiring
physical and mental examinations of witnesses, when such condition of a witness is
in issue; Federal Bureau of Investigation records of government witnesses for pur-
poses of impeachment. See Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery,
in Symposium-Discovery in Federal Crimzal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 92-93 (1964).
36 Such a burden might be too much for the prosecutor to bear, especially where
the interests of third parties are at stake.
37 Note, 74 HARv. L. Rzv. 940, 1055-58 (1961).
38 See State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) (dictum);
Flannery, The Prosecutor's Case Against More Liberal Discovery, in Symposium-
Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 74-81 (1964).
An important example of the problems involved concerns the identity of informers,
which the Government wishes to keep secret for as long as possible. Not only will
disclosure subject the informer to possible physical danger, but it will also end his
usefulness to the Government. Although disclosure is often required at trial, see
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), it is not presently required in cases
which are disposed of by a guilty plea. Pretrial discovery, however, might reveal an
informer's identity even in cases that never go to trial.
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much a protective order is needed, and once a witness' name is divulged,
the protective order can not erase the threat posed.39 One solution, pos-
sible in some cases, would be to notify witnesses before disclosing their
names in order to consider objections arising from any special knowledge
they might have regarding the defendant and to put them on guard against
intimidation. To minimize the opportunity for tampering, the names of
witnesses might be disclosed only a few days before trial 40 or only to
defendant's counsel.
Where defendant needs to know the substance of each witness' testi-
mony or knowledge of the facts, the mere identity of a witness will often
be insufficient, since the witness is under no obligation to talk to defense
counsel and may even have been urged by the police not to do so.
4 '
This information could be gained only by allowing pretrial discovery of
witnesses' statements to the Government. Such a practice would be limited
to some extent by the Jencks Act which, at the very least, prohibits in-
spection for the purpose of impeachment of relevant statements made to
government agents until after the witness has testified on direct examination
at trial.42 An alternative possibility would be to allow the defense, itself,
to take the witnesses' depositions under oath.43 Were such permission
given, it would, of course, be necessary to provide witnesses with the
full range of protective orders available to civil deponents 44 and, perhaps,
with counsel as well.
Distinct from the importance a protective order provision might have
in an expanded criminal discovery procedure is the role a protective order
might play in administering the as yet undefined amount of discovery
constitutionally required by the due process clause. Although at least two
39 See Hoffman, What Next in Federal Criminal Rules?, 21 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1, 15 (1964).
40 For an example of deferring discovery of witnesses' names until shortly before
trial, see People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16 (1963).
The deferring of discovery would, of course, limit the time the defense could
spend on preparation, so that this consideration would have to be weighed by the
court in formulating its relief.
41Symposiun--Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 93 (1964).
Police officers who are eye-witnesses have been particularly uncooperative with de-
fense counsel. Ibid.
42 The Jencks legislation was in direct response to Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957), which involved only the disclosure of witnesses' statements to
government agents for the purpose of impeachment. The act's legislative purpose
was to clarify the Jencks holding so as to prevent indiscriminate "fishing expeditions"
through government files endangering government secrets and national security.
See 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1861-64. It is arguable therefore that the
act was merely intended to strike the balance between defendant's need of a witness'
prior statement for impeachment and the Government's right to withhold it, and was
not intended to "restrict due process." Id. at 1862. In addition, the act refers only
to statements of "government witnesses" and not to those which the defendant might
seek to present on his own behalf.
43 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no provisions comparable
to the civil rules allowing discovery by oral depositions and written interrogatories.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 provides for taking the deposition of a witness
who will be unable to attend the trial, but depositions cannot be used for general
discovery purposes. See United States v. Grado, 154 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
44 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b), (d).
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Supreme Court cases ostensibly hold that denying pretrial discovery is not
in itself violative of due process, they are of questionable value as prece-
dent.4 5 A more recent decision by the Court indicates that the prosecution
is under a constitutional obligation to disclose any competent information
favorable to the defendant's case of which it has knowledge,4" including
the names of eye-witnesses.47 Since it is also clear that disclosure of such
information necessary for a fair trial would take precedence over the
interests of protecting the Government and third parties,48 the question
is no longer one of whether such discovery should be permitted, but rather
of the manner in which discovery should be conducted in order to minimize
the danger of abuse. It is possible that the protective order would provide
both an appropriate and convenient instrument in achieving this end.
HA.BEAS CORPUS-E.ECT OF SUPREME COURT CHANGE IN
LAw ON EXHAUSTION OP STATE REmEDIES REQuIsrE TO FEDERAL
HABEAS Corpus
The state prisoner desiring to obtain a federal writ of habeas corpus
to challenge his conviction as violative of the Federal Constitution or laws
must first meet the requirements of section 2254 of the Judicial Code by
showing that he "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective
process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective
to protect the rights of the prisoner." 1 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this provision as requiring the petitioner to show that presentation of his
claim to the state courts at the time he asks for federal habeas corpus
would be unavailing.2 Thus, this statutory codification of the doctrine
45 Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) ; Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
In Cicenia the prisoner did not stand trial, but rather pleaded non vult after denial of
a pretrial motion for inspection of his own and his accomplices' confessions, then
later moved for habeas corpus. In Leland the due process contention was rejected,
partly on the ground that defendant's sought-after confession was put in evidence
at trial five days before defendant closed his case and that defendant was offered
"further time" to study it.
46Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); cf. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959) (due process violated by prosecution's allowing perjured testimony against
defendant to go uncorrected). See generally Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional
Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
47 United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
48 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (due process limita-
tions on the Government's privilege to withhold the identity of a confidential informer).
128 U.S.C. §2254 (1958).
2 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963). When the prisoner has not attempted
to obtain relief in the state courts by pursuing a previously available state remedy,
the federal court will not hear his claim if his reasons for avoiding state courts
amount to a "deliberate by-passing of state procedures." Id. at 439. This "forfeiture"
rule constitutes "the only ground for which relief may be denied in federal habeas
corpus remedy for failure to raise a federal constitutional claim in the state courts."
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 370 n.1 (1964). If a prisoner has failed to raise
1951
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developed by the Court beginning with the 1886 decision of Ex parte
Royall enacts into law the principle that "if the doors of the state courts
and the federal courts are both currently open, a state prisoner ought to
try the state door first." 4
This principle is generally justified by allusions to the vague concept
of federal-state "comity," but several more specific objectives can be
pinpointed. To begin with, as a matter of "practical efficiency," state
courts are better suited to determine issues which "often concern local
attorneys and court personnel, and arise in a context of local procedures
and practices, with which state courts are familiar." o In addition, the
exhaustion requirement reduces the burden on the federal courts, because
in some cases state courts, themselves, will release prisoners on state or
federal law grounds, while in others, state decisions may clarify or limit
the federal issues 7 or satisfy the prisoner that his federal claim is not
meritorious. Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine gives state courts a
greater opportunity for constructive participation in the development of
federal law and perhaps a greater concern for its enforcement. s The
exhaustion requirement also induces state courts to develop state law as an
independent source of protection for the individual, a goal particularly im-
portant because in many areas the federal due process guarantee affords
only minimal safeguards. Finally, both the development of state law and
the release by state courts of their own prisoners make unnecessary other-
wise unavoidable decisions of federal constitutional questions and decrease
the potential points of friction between federal and state authorities.
his federal habeas claim during trial or to assert it in accordance with other state
rules of practice, he should be able to excuse his determination not to pursue his
federal claim by showing that he was faced by a wall of decisions denying relief to
prisoners claiming similar constitutional violations. He need not show that he was
faced with the "grisly choice" between life imprisonment and a possible death sentence
faced by the prisoner, Noia, 372 U.S. at 440, but can claim that he had no choice
at all. While the success of this argument will turn on the scope given by the federal
courts to the new Noia forfeiture concepts, it has been argued that there can be few
instances where a deliberate by-pass can be proved. See Badger, A Judicial Cul-de-
Sac: Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 50 A.B.A.J. 629, 631-32 (1964);
Note, Federal Habeas Corpus and Maryland Post-Conviction Remedies, 24 MD. L.
REv. 46, 63 (1964).
3 117 U.S. 241 (1886). The exhaustion requirement was applied at an early
date to appeals from state convictions. See Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516 (1886).
For a thorough discussion of the development of the exhaustion doctrine see generally
Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 793, 884-92 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam].
4 Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74
HARv. L. REV. 1315, 1364 (1961). The Supreme .Court adopted Professor Reitz's
arguments in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
5 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, stpra note 4, at 418; Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195
(1892).
6 Rose v. Dickson, 327 F.2d 27, 28 (9th Cir. 1964).
7 See Amsterdam 831. Federal judges may also be aided by a state opinion
elucidating local law. Cf. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners, 32
F.R.D. 88, 94-98 (1962).
8 This suggestion and the remainder of the reasons noted in this paragraph for
the exhaustion doctrine were taken from Amsterdam 830-31.
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A prisoner petitioning for federal habeas corpus has two basic methods
of demonstrating that presentation of his claim to the state courts would
be unavailing. Under the rule of Brown v. Allen,9 he can show that he
has already presented the same claim through the courts of the state to
the highest court that would hear it.10 He can also attempt to demonstrate
from other cases or from statutes that the state would not grant relief even
if he proved his allegations.-' Since each of these showings involves an
inference that the state courts would treat the prisoner's case in the same
way at the present time as they have treated his or other cases in the past,
application of the exhaustion doctrine becomes more difficult when a
petitioner asserts a federal claim affected by a Supreme Court decision
which was rendered after the most recent consideration of his case by a
state court and which changed the law in effect at that time.'2 To date,
federal courts have generally held that the exhaustion requirement is not
met when an intervening change in the law has occurred and have based
their holdings on the observation that state courts have not had an oppor-
tunity to apply the law, as changed, to the prisoner's case.'3
9 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
10 Id. at 447. As well as appealing his original conviction, the prisoner can meet
the exhaustion requirement by applying for the proper state collateral remedy and
appealing an adverse decision. Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1958)
(appeal from adverse judgment in state habeas corpus proceedings exhausted state
remedies). The requirement of application to the Supreme Court for certiorari in
order to exhaust state remedies was abolished by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435
(1963) (considered dictum).
"1 His proof may vary along a spectrum: at the strongest end is state legislation
restricting, for instance, the scope of collateral remedies; in the middle are judicial
decisions restricting remedies; perhaps weakest, though usually still sufficient to
satisfy the exhaustion requirement, are judicial decisions limiting substantive rights.
1 
2 Similar problems arise when the prisoner's factual allegations or legal grounds
before the federal courts vary from those asserted in the state courts, or when the
federal habeas corpus hearing discloses different facts from those on which the state
tribunals based their decisions. Determination of whether the "claim" being presented
to the federal court contains the "substantial equivalent of contentions presented by
petitioner to the state courts upon his appeal from conviction," Schiers v. California,
333 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1964), entitling the prisoner to federal habeas corpus,
has proved a vexing one for the courts. The prisoner can argue that the "claim"
he presented to the state court is one of violation of his right to due process of law,
and his federal claim is identical. The state, at the other extreme, can respond that
even when no new facts are alleged in the federal court, a new "claim" is made when
a prisoner urges different legal conclusions on the federal courts than he had presented
in the state. The problem of what constitutes a new claim often arises when an
applicable Supreme Court decision intervenes after state determination of the prisoner's
constitutional issues, but before action is taken on a habeas corpus petition by a
federal court.
Courts have avoided difficult questions in many cases by returning prisoners to
state courts when there is any doubt whether the claim is a new one, even though
it is very unlikely that state courts will reverse the conviction. See United States
ex rel. Calhoun v. Pate, 341 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1965) (petitioner held not to have
exhausted state remedies on a claim that no evidence supported his conviction, although
Illinois Supreme Court had affirmed his conviction over claim that evidence was insuffi-
cient for conviction); Tune v. Cunningham, 319 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1963) (while
state courts found no prejudice and therefore refused relief to petitioner on his
allegations of denial of counsel at his trial, claim of incompetency of counsel held
not exhausted).
'3 See Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel.
Walker v. Fogliani, 343 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965); Miller v. Gladden, 341 F.2d
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To reject automatically all such habeas corpus applications ignores
the concern for the perhaps unconstitutionally incarcerated prisoner which
has led both Congress and the courts to limit the exhaustion of state
remedies requirement. 14 Strong arguments can be made, however, that
a change in law can not always justify the court in finding a significant
likelihood that the state may reconsider the petitioner's claim. Even the
prisoner who has not pursued his claim through the state courts is entitled
to federal habeas corpus on a showing that state procedures for hearing
his claim are nonexistent or that "the alleged state remedy is nothing
but a procedural morass offering no substantial hope of relief." "I The
change in law should not alter petitioner's traditional opportunity to show
that the special circumstances of his case justify federal habeas corpus
notwithstanding theoretically existing state remedies.
1 7  In the exercise
of its broad discretion to entertain the habeas application notwithstanding
the new decision,'8 the court should weigh, in the context of the particular
case, the likelihood that the state will reconsider the prisoner's claim against
the interests of the prisoner in obtaining immediate federal review.
The federal courts will find this task easiest where the state has
already announced some response to the change in law. Thus, if the
972 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Commonwealth
ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 339 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1964) (per curiam) ; Hunt v.
Warden, 335 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1964) ; United States ex rel. Bagley v. LaVallee, 332
F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Midgett v. Warden, 329 F2d 185 (4th Cir. 1964) ; United
States ex rel. Campbell v. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964); Donnell v. Nash,
323 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 924 (1964); Mahurin v. Nash,
321 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 977 (1964). But see Whippler
v. Balkcom, 342 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Cobb v. Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.
1964) ; United States ex rel. Mancini v. Rundle, 337 F2d 268 (3d Cir. 1964) ; United
States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964).
14 See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
15 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958) ; see, e.g., United States ex rel. LaNear v. LaVallee,
306 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1962) (no state postconviction remedy available to prisoner
convicted in another state) ; Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964) (neither
habeas corpus nor coram nobis would lie in state courts to test constitutionality of
prisoner's confinement); Peters v. Dillon, 227 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1964) (relief
would not be given under new state procedure).
16Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 564 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring); see
Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963) (per curiam) (dictum) ; 22 IND.
L.J. 262, 263 n.9 (1947).
17 See Amsterdam 894. The "special circumstances" exception to the exhaustion
doctrine was a part of its first Supreme Court formulation. Ex parte RoyalU, 117
U.S. 241, 253 (1886). For application of the exception as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1958), see, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 915 (1958) (state appellate review costs beyond petitioner's
means) ; United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 216 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1954)
(death sentence scheduled prior to time state would act on his claim); Thomas v.
Teets, 205 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910 (1953).
The question whether habeas corpus is available in advance of state appeal where,
by reason of the shortness of the sentence, the case will be mooted before appellate
decision can be had seems to have been answered in the affirmative by the Supreme
Court in In re Shuttlesworth, 369 U.S. 35 (1962), at least where substantial federal
equal protection issues are raised. Amsterdam 895-96. For other applications of the
"special circumstances" doctrine see generally id. at 892-94.
18 Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418-19 (1963). When the existence of a state
collateral remedy is unclear, the courts generally have not exercised this discretion
but have required the prisoner to apply to the state for relief. Amsterdam 900 n.465.
See note 13 sipra and accompanying text
petitioner can prove that the highest state court has refused to apply the
new Supreme Court decision to cases such as his, by showing for instance
that it has refused to apply the decision retroactively, 19 sending him back
to the state courts would be a useless gesture. His claim to the writ would
seem equally strong if the state would not grant him relief due to a pro-
cedural default in the trial or appeal process which the state said con-
tituted a "waiver" of his claim, and if the state's post-Fay v. Noia20 de-
cisions refused to adopt federal forfeiture standards. On the other hand,
a state which has enlarged post-conviction remedies to ensure relief in
light of the new decision should be allowed to pass again on the petitioner's
claim. 21
Where the state has given no indication of how it will treat the new
Supreme Court decision, the federal court should look to the traditional
practices of the state. If the state's refusal to grant the petitioner's claim
were on the merits and the intervening Supreme Court decision worked a
significant change in the applicable law, the federal court should generally
require that the prisoner present his claim to the state courts after the
change in law, unless he can show that there are no state courts which
will hear his claim. If, before the intervening Supreme Court decision,
the state refused or would have refused to hear his claim on the ground
that this claim could not be raised collaterally or that it had been forfeited,
either a substantive Supreme Court holding bearing on the petitioner's
claim or an enunciation of a new procedural doctrine regulating the scope
of federal habeas corpus might induce the state court to change its position.
However, since neither of these adjudications is binding as to state for-
feiture doctrine or collateral remedies, the federal court in such a case
should find that the petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement
unless the state makes some additional showing that it will alter its stand.
23
This burden will be a difficult one for the state to meet if it has shown
in the past a general unwillingness to grant collateral relief for claims
founded on new Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution. On
19 United States ex el Mancini v. Rundle, 337 F.2d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1964)
(state had held Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), prospective only). The conflict
over the retroactivity of Mapp was resolved in Linkletter v. Warden, 85 Sup. Ct.
1731 (1965), the Supreme Court holding Mapp prospective only.
20 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
21 Compare Whippler v. Balkcom, 342 F2d 388 (5th Cir. 1965), with Blair v.
California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965).
22Despite strong urging that the state courts adopt federal waiver standards,
for a recent example of which see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1965),
only a small minority of the states relying on habeas corpus to hear constitutional
questions have satisfied the Fay v. Noia tests. Note, State Post-Conviction Remedies
and Federal Habeas Corpus, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 154, 166 (1965). Most states still
cling to the common-law notion of restricting habeas corpus to a challenge to the
court's jurisdiction, and grant corain nobis only if the judgment in question rested
on a substantial error of fact, not appearing in the record and unknown to the court
at the time of trial. Id. at 158-59. Arguments for state adoption of federal standards
are presented in Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal
Postconviction Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928 (1964).
23 Compare Midgett v. Warden, 329 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1964), with Cobb v.
Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1964). See generally Note, State Post-Conviction
Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 22, at 193-96.
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the other hand, a state might well satisfy this requirement by showing
only that it has enlarged its collateral remedies or altered its forfeiture
rules in response to previous Supreme Court expansions of substantive
rights.2 4
To the extent that the federal court is in doubt that the state will
alter its position, the court should allow its decision on exhaustion to be
influenced by two additional factors. First, federal courts should be reluc-
tant to find a lack of exhaustion on the part of a prisoner in a state whose
remedial procedures, if they exist, are likely to entail considerable delay2 5
Second, the federal court should give weight to the number of times the
prisoner has presented his federal constitutional claim to the state courts.
While the rule of Brown v. Allen that one journey through the state courts
entitles a prisoner to a federal forum 26 is not strictly applicable to the
situation where a Supreme Court decision has changed the law governing
the prisoner's contention,2 7 the general principle of Brown-that there is
a limit to the burden any individual should be forced to bear for the sake
of the federal-state system-still has validity. Decisions that gave the
prisoner who had not presented his constitutional claim to the state courts
the heavy burden of proving an absence of available state remedies have
been severely criticized; 28 placing this burden on a prisoner who has
appealed his conviction to the state's highest court and who, were it not
for the Supreme Court decision, would be automatically entitled to con-
sideration of his claim in federal court seems unreasonable.
Proper application of the exhaustion doctrine to cases involving new
Supreme Court decisions can be illustrated by reference to recent cases in
the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Cobb v. Balkcom,2 9
for example, involved a prisoner whose appeal was based on the ground
that Negroes had been systematically excluded from his grand and traverse
juries. The appeal was rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court, which
held that the prisoner's failure to raise this defense at trial constituted a
waiver thereof.30 After the Supreme Court had established new, strict
2- See Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1965).
2 Cf. In re Shuttlesworth, 369 U.S. 35 (1962) (Supreme Court gave state five
days to grant prisoner relief or admit him to bail pending such relief, failing which
he would be held to have exhausted state remedies) ; United States ex rel. Dalton v.
Myers, 342 F.2d 202, 203 (3d Cir. 1965) (hearing required on prisoner's claim, and
state court would give him one promptly).
26 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
27 See Hunt v. Warden, 335 F.2d 936, 943 (4th Cir. 1964); Donnell v. Nash,
323 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 924 (1964).
28 On the adoption of the Judicial Code, Professor Wechsler claimed that placing
this burden on the prisoner would engender muddled postconviction procedures per-
mitting unnecessary procrastination in the state courts. Wechsler, Federal Juris-
diction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 230-31
(1948). Wechsler notes that in all other important situations under the Judicial Code
there is an assumption that the party who objects to jurisdiction will establish that
a remedy exists. Id. at 230. Amsterdam says the decision to place the burden on
the prisoner has been "rightly condemned." Amsterdam 900.
29 339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1964).
:o Cobb v. State, 218 Ga. 10, 126 S.E.2d. 231 (1962).
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waiver standards in Fay v. Noia,31 the prisoner petitioned for federal
habeas corpus. The Fifth Circuit held that he had exhausted his state
remedies and, deciding the substantive issue, granted relief.2 2  Although
the opinion does not deal with the question of delay in the state courts,
it does make clear that the Georgia courts had repeatedly adhered to their
definition of "waiver" and that they had given no indication of changing
in response to Noia.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in Cobb is confirmed by a post-Noia deci-
sion of the Georgia Supreme Court, not cited in the Cobb opinion, reiterat-
ing Georgia's historical definition of waiver and declining to consider a
systematic exclusion claim in a collateral proceeding 2 3 This Georgia
opinion was properly relied on by the Fifth Circuit in another case,
Whippler v. Balkcon, 4 to hold that a prisoner had met the requirements
of section 2254, even on claims which he had never presented to the state
courts.2 5
An example of proper use of the exhaustion doctrine to remit a habeas
corpus petitioner to the state courts may be seen in the Ninth Circuit case
of Blair v. California.P6 There the California District Court of Appeals
had refused to appoint counsel to represent Blair on his appeal from a
narcotics convictionm 7 After the United States Supreme Court decision
in Douglas v. California 8 upheld indigents' right to have counsel appointed
on appeal, petitioner applied for federal habeas corpus. Upon the state's
showing that a procedure was available to assert this claim in the state
courts and that the Supreme Court of California had already ordered
appointment of counsel on appeal for one defendant who had used that
procedure,39 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied relief and
ordered the proceedings held in abeyance to afford the prisoner a reason-
able opportunity to exhaust his state remedies. This procedure was fol-
lowed by the Fifth Circuit in Pate v. Holnan,40 where a prisoner similarly
31372 U.S. 391 (1963).
3
2 The court allowed the state a reindictment and retrial within a reasonable time
before juries from which Negroes had not been systematically excluded. 339 F.2d
at 102.
23 Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d 766 (1964).
24 342 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1965). To open the habeas corpus door, "the magic
words are 'deprivation of counsel." Id. at 391. Petitioner had already presented
three of his contentions of constitutional infirmity to the state courts. Judge Wisdom's
well-reasoned opinion did not discuss these allegations as they fell within the one-
journey-through-the-state-courts rule of Brown v. Allen.
35 Cf. United States ex rel. Mancini v. Rundle, 337 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1964),
afflirming 219 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
26 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965).
37 The intermediate court affirmed the trial court judgment, and the state supreme
court denied a petition for a hearing. 340 F.2d at 742 n.1. The Ninth Circuit stated
that it was not concerned in Blair with the question of whether the taking of an
appeal was necessary to exhaust state remedies. Id. at 744 n.6 (citing Fay v. Noia).
38 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
39 Vasquez v. District Court of 'Appeal, 59 Cal. 2d 585, 381 P2d 203, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 467 (1963).
40 343 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1965).
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claiming denial of right to counsel in light of the Douglas case was in-
structed to apply for relief under a post-conviction statute adopted by the
Alabama legislature in response to a recent Supreme Court decision whose
ambit was sufficiently broad that the Fifth Circuit felt the prisoner's
claim could be properly heard under it.41
In United States ex rel. Walker v. Fogliani,'2 however, the Ninth
Circuit applied Blair without an adequate inquiry into its rationale. Con-
fronted with a prisoner who had challenged his conviction through the
state courts on the ground that his confession in the absence of counsel
was not voluntary, the court invoked the exhaustion doctrine to permit
the state courts to reconsider the challenge to the confession in the light
of Escobedo v. Illinois.43 The Ninth Circuit's action was apparently
based on the unsupported assertion by the state that its habeas corpus
procedure was available to hear the claim.44 Thus, the federal court failed
to consider whether this state procedure had been made available to hear
similar claims in the past and whether pursuance of the alleged state
remedy was likely to result in unnecessary delay. Such summary remand
of a habeas corpus applicant, especially one who had met the Brown v.
Allen requirement of one trip through the state courts, is indeed "com-
pulsive comity," 4 subject to the "reproach that it is the prisoner rather
than the state remedy that is being exhausted." 4
JUDGES-vAIABiLITY OF MANDAMUS To OMER DisQUA i~icA-
TION oF JUDGE WHo MET WITH- COUNSEL FOR PARTY LITIGANT
IN- PREVIOUS MANDAMUS PROCEEDING IN THE SAME CASE
Defendants in a wrongful death action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sought and obtained transfer
of venue to Massachusetts, the state in which the accident occurred.
Plaintiffs, fearing application to the case of Massachusetts' 20,000-dollar
maximum recovery limit,' sought mandamus in the Court of Appeals for
411d. at 547-48.
42 342 F2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965).
43 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Walker court's ground for sending the prisoner
back to the state courts may have been a belief that the "claim" he wished to present
to the federal court had never been presented to the state courts, see note 12 supra,
but the court did not so indicate.
44 See also Commonwealth ex tel. Raymond v. Rundle, 339 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.
1964) (per curiam).
45 Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle,
39 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 78, 99 (1964).
46 United States ex rel. Kling v. LaVallee, 306 F2d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 1962)
(Friendly, J., concurring).
1 Mass. Acts & Resolves 1958, ch. 238, § 2, at 122. The present provision, MASS.
Gmur. LAws ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1964), provides a maximum recovery of $30,000.
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, allows unlimited recovery. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 1601-04 (1953). Plaintiffs feared that the Massachusetts court would, under Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), apply the Massachusetts law.
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the Third Circuit to set aside the transfer. In accordance with its usual
mandamus procedure, the court directed the judge below to file answers
to each of the mandamus petitions. The judge followed the common
practice of appointing defendants' attorneys as his counsel, consulted with
them concerning his answer, and suggested changes in the draft of the
answer. 2 Upon issuance of the writ of mandamus,3 the judge joined with de-
fendants in a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, which reversed.
4
Because of its decision that the Pennsylvania conflict of laws rule would
be binding on the Massachusetts district court, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the Pennsylvania district court for reconsideration of
the transfer motion. On remand plaintiffs moved under section 455 of the
Judicial Code 5 for the judge to recuse himself, alleging that his par-
ticipation in the previous mandamus proceeding would destroy his im-
partiality in hearing the transfer issue on remand. Upon his refusal, they
again sought mandamus. The court of appeals held that the judge should
have disqualified himself and said it would issue mandamus ordering him
to do so unless he complied voluntarily. Rapp v. Van Dusen, No. 14927,
3d Cir., Dec. 16, 1964, rehearing granted April 6, 1965.
In only a few reported cases have appellate courts disqualified judges
on petition for mandamus or prohibition.6 The courts denying the writs
have taken varying approaches. In one case the court, recognizing the
importance of early review of a disqualification claim, said that the filing
of a petition for mandamus was the appropriate time for review of a claim
of disqualification, but denied the petition on the merits.7 Some courts
have either omitted discussion of the appropriateness of mandamus 8 or
explicitly assumed its availability,9 and then decided on the facts that there
were no grounds for disqualification. Other courts have said that man-
damus was not appropriate, but that in any event no factual grounds for
disqualification existed.10 The final group of courts denying the writ
2 judge Van Dusen explicitly dissociated himself from defendants' argument that
since plaintiffs had an adequate remedy under the Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1958), mandamus was unavailable. Although the court mentioned no
other suggested changes, it seems that the judge did make some other minor sug-
gestions. See Petitioners' Consolidated Appendix, pp. 35aa-41aa, instant case.
3 Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir.), rev'd, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
4 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
528 U.S.C. § 455 (1958).
6 Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1962) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963); United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30
(10th Cir. 1959) (per curiam), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 946 (1960) ; Gladstein v. Mc-
Laughlin, 230 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1955) (no writ actually issued in the belief that the
judge, upon reading the opinion, would disqualify himself voluntarily); Connelly v.
United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951).7 In the Matter of Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 927 (1961) ; see Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1958) (E-astie,
c., oncurring).
8 See Cuddy v. Otis, 33 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1929); Henry v. Speer, 201 Fed.
869 (5th Cir. 1913). Perhaps the parties never raised the issue.
9 See Williams v. Kent, 216 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1954); In re Lisman, 89 F.2d
898 (2d Cir. 1937).
10 See Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Minnesota & Ont. Paper
Co. v. Molyneaux, 70 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1934) (explicitly leaving open the possibility
of unusual circumstances which might justify issuance of the writ).
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based their decisions entirely on the inappropriateness of review by
mandamus."
These varying approaches seem to represent a conflict between two
inconsistent aims-a desire to limit the availability of mandamus 2 and a
reluctance to return a case for trial with a disqualification claim still hang-
ing over the judge. An attempt to accommodate both considerations is
most evident in the decisions which held mandamus unavailable but none-
theless went on to say that the substantive claim was without merit. This
approach, although resolving the conflict for the particular case then at
bar, might create problems for future cases. A later decision by the same
court denying a writ solely on the unavailability of mandamus, for instance,
would imply that there was at least an arguable basis for the demand of
disqualification and thus bring pressures to bear on the judge to step
aside even though on a full consideration of the merits he might well be
found to have acted properly.
13
Attempts to accommodate both considerations emphasize the im-
portance of early review of the disqualification claim. Any claim of bias
creates an air of tension in the courtroom. In addition, it leads to a lack
of confidence in the judicial system.14 Moreover immediate review is
desirable in view of the fact that the adequacy of the remedy by appeal
seems questionable.15 It is true that Korer v. Hoffman 16 suggests that
the remedy by appeal would be fully adequate since the appellate court
must consider the disqualification question first, and, if it finds that the
trial judge erred in not disqualifying himself, must go no further and
11 See Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958) ; People ex tel. Tinkoff v.
Campbell, 212 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Korer v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211 (7th Cir.
1954) ; Dilling v. United States, 142 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1944). The court in the
instant case distinguished its earlier decision in Green v. Murphy, supra, on two
grounds. Instant case s.o. at 5. First, the court said that if the transfer motion were
granted, the only review possible in the Third Circuit would necessarily be inter-
locutory. Second, the court said that because the claim of disqualification arose from
matters resulting from its own order, the review by mandamus would be in the
exercise of its supervisory power and in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Except
perhaps for Korer, the possibility of such extenuating circumstances as might justify
mandamus seems to be conceded in these cases.
12 See, e.g., Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1955), where, per-
haps as a result of this reluctance, the court avoided actual issuance of the writ in the
belief that the judge would recuse himself.
13 In In re Greene, 160 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1947), the Third Circuit expressly left
open the issue of the appropriateness of review by mandamus of a disqualification
claim and denied the disqualification claim on the merits. After denial of a petition
solely on the inappropriateness of mandamus in Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d
Cir. 1958), the trial judge disqualified himself. United States v. Gilboy, 166 F. Supp.
220 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
14 See Green v. Murphy, supra note 13, at 595 (Hastie, J., concurring).
15 See Connelly v. United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951), which
drew an analogy from Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), where the Court
had said that a trial judge could not consider the truthfulness of a § 144 affidavit
because the remedy by appeal would be inadequate. But see General Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 952 (1964); Green
v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Korer v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211 (7th Cir.
1954).
16212 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1954).
immediately order a new trial by a different judge. 1 7  However, if an
appellate court were convinced that retrial by a new judge would result
in the same judgment, it might tend to apply more lenient standards to the
disqualification claim or even to find harmless error.'8 Either course of
action would be particularly unsatisfactory to the losing litigant. To
ensure full consideration of a disqualification claim, it would seem best to
review the charge as early as possible.'9 Therefore the merits of the claim
should be considered on a petition for mandamus.
Disqualification of judges seems to be controlled exclusively 2 ° by
sections 144 and 455 of the Judicial Code.2 ' Section 144, which provides
for disqualification upon allegation that the judge is personally biased or
prejudiced, is inapplicable to this case, since no personal bias was charged
and since, in any case, the actions of the judge were insufficient to establish
personal bias. 2 Section 455 provides for disqualification if the judge has
certain specific connections with the case,2 three of which are arguably
17 Of course there might be a wasted trial but, as the court pointed out, this is
possible in any case in which allegedly reversible error has been committed. Id. at
215. But see Note, 52 CAL.n L. REv. 1036, 1049 (1964), which suggests that because
error in disqualification demands reversal regardless of the merits of the case, it is
an appropriate issue for interlocutory review.
18 See FmD. R. Civ. P. 61.
19 A trial taking place before a judge alleged to be personally biased, particu-
larly when the claimed bias has apparently become a matter of public notice
and interest, may be incompatible with the proper administration of justice.
If the claim is sufficiently meritorious, the proceeding should be aborted
rather than corrected.
In the Matter of Union Leader Corp., 292 F2d 381, 384 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 927 (1961).
20 Duncan v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 223 Fed. 446 (S.D. Ga. 1915); The
Richmond, 9 Fed. 863 (C.C.E.D. La. 1881) ; see Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
147 F.2d 589, 592-93 (7th Cir. 1945) (dictum). However, due process requires
disqualification in some cases, even in the absence of statutory rules. Cf. Its re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (state criminal case).
It is arguable that these statutes are unconstitutional as a congressional exercise
of the judicial power granted to the courts by article III of the Constitution. Cf.
In re Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas. 16 (No. 12811) (D. Ala. 1865) (alternative holding)
(semble) (statute prescribing regulations for admission to the bars of federal courts
held invalid as an invasion of the judicial power). However, it seems unlikely that
these statutes will be found unconstitutional on this ground. The original version
of § 455 was enacted in Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 279, and except
for amendments enlarging its scope, has remained on the books ever since. No case
has been found where the constitutionality of either of the disqualification statutes has
been drawn into question.
2128 U.S:C. §§ 144, 455 (1958).
22 Cf. United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.) (alternative holding), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951).
2 3 Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been
a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his
attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial,
appeal, or other proceeding therein.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1958). Only the of-counsel and the so-related-or-connected clauses
were urged by plaintiffs. See instant case s.o. at 6.
Normally the substantial-interest clause applies only to a financial or pecuniary
interest. See Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1962) (dictum),
where the court, although willing to accept a lawyer's desire to press a case to a
successful conclusion as "substantial interest," rejected the disqualification claim on
other grounds. The so-related-or-connected clause is difficult for an appellate court
to apply because its very terms leave a broad discretion with the judge.
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broad enough to demand recusation in the present case. The judge may
be said to have had a "substantial interest" in the case, to have been "of
counsel," or to have been "so related to or connected with any party or
his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the
trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein."
The primary policy consideration behind these provisions is the
principle that "a man should not be a judge in his own cause." 24 Of
course if the chance is great that the judge's decision will not be wholly
impartial, there is good reason for him to disqualify himself. But even
if it appears that the judge will probably decide fairly, there remains a
strong basis for disqualification if an outside observer would doubt the
judge's impartiality.2 5 On the other hand, disqualification should not be
too readily available.2 6 If, as in the present case, the request comes after
the judge has become familiar with the case, a change will have a disruptive
effect on the proceedings 27 which could be used by an unprincipled lawyer
as a dilatory tactic. A second potential danger of easy disqualification is
that the parties would be able, by frivolous charges, to select their own
judges. This abuse is not only contrary to the primary purpose of allow-
ing disqualification-to guarantee that an impartial judge will preside
over the proceedings-but also impairs the smooth and proper adminis-
tration of the courts. Most of the evils of easy disqualification probably
could be avoided simply by refusing to act on frivolous claims. Trial
judges, however, should be willing to disqualify themselves whenever their
impartiality is seriously questioned, even though the individual judge might
feel well qualified to hear the case.2 8
In the present case, the judge took several steps which plaintiffs
urged as grounds for disqualification. First, he appointed defendants'
counsel to represent him in the initial mandamus proceeding. This act
however accords with standard procedure,2 9 and suggests no impropriety.
Second, the judge's suggested changes in the draft of the answer were also
entirely proper. He asked only to be dissociated from one argument-
that mandamus was unavailable since no attempt had been made to secure
24 Spencer v. Lapsley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 264, 266 (1858) (dictum). The case
implies that the statute was an enactment of this common law rule. See id. at 270;
Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE LJ. 605, 626-30 (1947).
25 Courts, on occasion, have referred to the importance of the appearance of
justice. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
2 6 One judge expressed the belief that he had the duty not to disqualify himself
unless he had a legal reason for so doing. Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965).
27 This problem can be alleviated in two ways. First, the failure to make a
timely objection could lead to a holding that the objecting party had waived his
claim. Second, the mere potential of a disruptive effect could lead to a general
stiffening of the requirements for disqualification.
28 Cf. United States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240 (D.D.C. 1957), where the
judge disqualified himself on his own motion after being visited in chambers by a
personal acquaintance, not a lawyer in the case, who came to inquire about the date
of a ruling in the trial.
29 See Petitioners' Consolidated Appendix, pp. 3aa-4aa, instant case.
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review by way of the Interlocutory Appeals Act 30-because he felt plain-
tiffs should not be penalized for failure to use that procedure.3 ' Third, the
judge joined the petition for certiorari. Although apparently his action
was solely at the insistence of defendants' counsel,8 2 his wisdom in this
regard was certainly dubious. But the most questionable aspect of Judge
Van Dusen's behavior was his ex parte meeting with defendants' counsel.33
Particularly since the judge was a defendant in name only, the meeting
was unnecessary. Since the meeting was ex parte, plaintiffs were forced to
rely on the judge and on defendants' counsel to learn what happened.
Although hopefully there should be no reason to hesitate in placing full
trust in a judge's truthfulness, the mere necessity of such reliance indicates
that it would be wiser for the judge to disqualify himself in such a situa-
tion8 4 and thus to avoid embarrassing the appellate court or the judicial
system as a whole.
Although Judge Van Dusen probably should have disqualified himself,
it does not follow that the appellate court's action was proper. Both its
reasoning and its result raise serious questions. Rather than relying on
the disqualification statutes, the court first criticized any mandamus pro-
cedure which compelled the judge to be an involuntary litigant, obliged to
file an answer. Deciding that this procedure was inappropriate in cases
in which review of an interlocutory order was sought, the court abolished
its requirement that the judge file an answer. The court said that in the
future a show-cause order should be directed against the other party to
the litigation.35 The court thus removed judges from future mandamus
proceedings,8 6 and eliminated the necessity for them to obtain counsel.
Finding no reason not to extend the benefits of the new procedure to the
present case, it disqualified the judge without discussing the statutory
standards.
8028 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
81 See Petitioners' Consolidated Appendix, p. 4aa.
32 See Petitioners' Consolidated Appendix, p. 33aa.
83 See Barnes v. United States, 241 F.2d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 1956) (dictum)
(judge should not talk to litigants off the bench, and many judges have a strict rule
against discussing the merits of any case off the bench, even with lawyers in the case
and never outside the presence of lawyers for both sides). But cf. Willenbring v.
United States, 306 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1962) (judge's ex parte conference with the
Assistant U.S. Attorney did not establish § 144 bias).
34 In a similar situation a judge exercised his discretion and disqualified himself
on his own motion so as to maintain a complete appearance of impartiality. United
States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240 (D.D.C. 1957). However, the judge in
Quattrone noted that disqualification clearly was not mandatory.
35 Instant case s.o. at 9. Rule 20 of the proposed Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure likewise does not compel the judge to answer. See id. at 9 n.25.
86 The judge will continue to be a party, however, in the rare case where the
order is directed against the judge personally. Instant case s.o. at 10 n.26. See
Hall v. West, 335 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964) (recalcitrant judge ordered to carry out
Supreme Court's 1954 desegregation order) ; Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 318
F2d 63 (5th Cir. 1963) (judge required to rule promptly on motion for preliminary
injunction).
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Since disqualification is controlled exclusively by statute,3 7 it would
have been appropriate for the court at least to have discussed the standards
laid down by Congress. Moreover, the court's handling of the case was
certainly not calculated to alleviate any embarrassment or tension which
might have arisen between the trial and appellate courts. The court of
appeals, in effect, told Judge Van Dusen that he had done nothing which
he could have known was wrong, but that since in the future such conduct
would be considered undesirable, he was required to disqualify himself,
even though he felt competent to sit. 3 Such a rebuke is bound to interfere
with the smooth administration of the courts.
Despite the weakness in the court's reasoning, its result would be ac-
ceptable if the judge's action would have required disqualification under
the statute. However, the standards under which an appellate court should
disqualify a trial judge should require a connection with the case clearer
than that which would impel the trial judge to disqualify himself. If the
judge disqualifies himself, the effect on public confidence in him is quite
different from the effect of an appellate court's finding that he erred in
refusing to disqualify himself. In the first instance, the appearance of the
judge's fairness is enhanced, while in the second it suffers great harm.
This adverse effect on public confidence in the judicial system, along with
the potential abuses of easy disqualification, 89 demands at the very least
that a strong burden be placed on a party seeking disqualification on appeal.
In the present case, that strong burden does not seem to have been
met. The judge's conduct was certainly justifiable.40  Apparently little
went on at the meeting,41 and in any case, the parties could have been re-
quested to set forth the details. In a somewhat similar case, in which
the judge, in an ex parte meeting, discussed with one party's counsel the
requirements relative to answering certain interrogatories, the appellate
court refused to order disqualification under section 144. -  Seeming to
recognize that a meeting might have some legitimate purpose, the court
said, "so far as can be gathered from the affidavit the Judge may simply
have answered some inquiry as to the proper procedure." 4 No more
seems to have happened in the present case, and in any event, the dis-
qualification statutes seem to be aimed at more direct involvement in the
case than was present here.
37 See note 20 mipra and accompanying text.
38 Cf. instant case s.o. at 12 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
39 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. In Indiana just such abuses have
led to criticism of the easy disqualification policy of that state. See, e.g., Note,
38 IND. L.J. 289 (1963).
40 Cf. It re Lisman, 89 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1937). The court there scrutinized
each action of the judge offered in support of disqualification and, finding each sus-
ceptible to a reasonable explanation, refused to disqualify him.
41 See Petitioners' Consolidated Appendix, pp. 4aa, 33aa.
4
2United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.) (alternative holding), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951).
43Id. at 6.
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LABOR LAW-REFusA, To REFER EMPLOYEES FOR WORK UPON
A SrNGLE Sn FouND NOT To BE A SECONDARY BOYCOTT
Pursuant to the International Longshoremen's Association's policy of
not working ships which had engaged in trade with Cuba, a local union
refused, despite its hiring hall agreement, to refer its members to the
Maryland Ship Ceiling Company for work on the Tulse Hill. Upon the
filing of unfair labor practice charges by Ocean Shipping Service Limited,
Tulse Hill's owner, the National Labor Relations Board found that the
refusal constituted "threats, restraint and coercion," and had an object of
forcing Maryland to cease doing business with Ocean I in violation of the
National Labor Relations Act's secondary boycott provision, section 8(b)
(4) (ii) (B).2 The court of appeals interpreted the act as making the
existence of a labor dispute-i.e., a controversy concerning employment
conditions or bargaining representation 3-a condition of the Board's
jurisdiction. Finding no labor dispute, the court reversed, concluding that
in any event no secondary boycott within the meaning of section 8(b) (4)
(ii) (B) of the act had occurred. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964).
The court of appeals based its holding that a labor dispute is requisite
to Board jurisdiction on two grounds: (1) that the term "labor dispute"
is found throughout the act,4 and (2) that the Supreme Court has stated
that the National Labor Relations Act was designed "to regulate the
conduct of people engaged in labor disputes." 5 As to the first ground, it
should be noted that the frequency of the act's use of the phrase "labor
dispute" is not determinative of the question of jurisdiction. No explicit
stricture in the act limits the Board's jurisdiction to cases which arise
out of a "labor dispute." 1 Moreover, since the Board has been given
jurisdiction "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice . . . affecting commerce," 7 and since the facts of the present
case arguably constitute one such unfair labor practice, it is hard to perceive
the reason for denying Board jurisdiction 8 As to the second ground, it
1 Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Ocean Shipping Serv., Ltd.), 146
N.L.R.B. 723 (1964).
2 Added by 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (Supp. V, 1964).
3 National Labor Relations Act § 2(9), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9)
(1958).
4 Instant case at 995. The term is found, for example, in §§ 2(7) and 2(9).
Instant case at 995, quoting dictum in Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama
S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 372 (1960).
6 Compare the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1958), which is limited on its face to cases arising out of labor disputes.
7 National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958). The unfair labor practices are listed in § 8, which does
not limit its purview to labor disputes. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1964); cf. NLRB v. Local 11,
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 242 F.2d 932, 934-35 (6th Cir. 1957).
8 It has also been argued that since § 2(3) of the act, 49 Stat 450 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958), defines employees as including any individual who ceased
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should be pointed out that while the Supreme Court's dictum that the act
was designed to regulate parties to labor disputes properly characterizes
the main function of the act, it need not follow that the act has no other
function. In any case, the Supreme Court's language was somewhat
imprecise.9
The purpose of section 8(b) (4)'s secondary boycott provision is to
protect a neutral employer from enduring the pressures and consequences
of a dispute to which he is not a party."' Consequently, the section should
not be read so narrowly as to include only unfair labor practices having
their origins in labor disputes. This is because the neutral is equally
uninvolved and equally affected whatever the cause of the dispute."1
Moreover, to direct inquiry to the existence of the secondary boycott rather
than to its origins is in keeping with the statement of the provision's chief
legislative proponent that there is no such thing as a distinction between
"good" and "bad" secondary boycotts.' 2
After deciding that the Board lacked jurisdiction, the present court,
as was noted above, proceeded to review the merits of the Board's deci-
sion 13 and found that there was no secondary boycott. This latter deter-
mination was based on the court's belief that both elements necessary for
a finding of a section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) violation-(l) "threats, restraint
work as a consequence of "any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice," the terms are not synonymous or interdependent. 51 VA. L. Rzv. 157, 161-62
(1965). But it seems clear that this definition was intended merely to bring within
the scope of the act persons who would not, in common parlance, be considered
employees, i.e., persons who lose their employment as a result of a labor dispute (for
example, replaced economic strikers) and persons whose dismissal constitutes an
unfair labor practice. The section does not compel the conclusion that unfair labor
practices can have their origin in controversies other than labor disputes.
9 One indication of this lack of precision is that not all "people" come within the
purview of the act. Sections 8(a) and (b) are limited to unfair labor practices
committed by employers, labor unions, or their respective representatives. The Court
thus defined in broad strokes a term whose meaning and application were not at issue.
10 See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692
(1951); IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951);
Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L.
Rxv. 1086, 1112-13 (1960); Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The
Reach of NLRA § 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000, 1003 (1965).
11 The prohibited object of the boycott is stated by the statute to be "forcing
• .. any employer or other person to cease using . . .the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer . . . ." That is a prohibited
object whether the union has or has not a dispute with such "other producer,
processor, or manufacturer."
NLRB v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' Dist. Council, 211 F.2d 149, 152
(9th Cir. 1954) (dictum); accord, NLRB v. Local 751, United Bhd. of Carpenters,
285 F.2d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Local 11, United Bhd. of Carpenters,
242 F.2d 932, 934-35 (6th Cir. 1957) ; see Lesnick, supra note 10; Comment, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 463, 464-65 (1965) ; Comment, 51 VA. L. Rxv. 157-60 (1965).
12 It has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts and bad
secondary boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never
succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference between different kinds of
secondary boycotts. So we have so broadened the provision dealing with sec-
ondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice.
93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
13 The court examined the merits to avoid the necessity of a remand should the
Supreme Court review the case and decide to reverse the jurisdictional holding.
Instant case at 996.
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or coercion," and (2) "an object of forcing or requiring any person .
to cease doing business with any other person . . ." 
14-were absent from
the case. The court reasoned that a bare refusal to refer, unaccompanied
by any other acts, did not constitute "threats, restraint or coercion"e and
maintained that the union's only object was the elimination of trade with
Cuba.15
At least two courts of appeals, however, have adopted the approach
that a refusal to refer which substantially hinders the neutral's business
with the primary constitutes "restraint or coercion." 16 Those cases might
conceivably be distinguished from the present case because they involved
a total refusal to refer any employees to the neutral, while in the present
case relations between the ILA and the neutral remained normal except
for the refusal to work Tulse Hill.17 But this distinction should not be
14 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), added by 73 Stat 542 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (Supp. V, 1964). The Supreme Court has held that
the other person need not be an employer covered by the act. Plumbers Local 298
v. County of Door, 359 U.S. 354 (1959) ; Local 25, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956).
15 Instant case at 998.
16 Local 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963); Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs
v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1963). The Board, in considering refusals to refer,
seems to have developed two different approaches: first, that a refusal to refer ipso
facto constitutes "restraint or coercion," see Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n
(Ocean Shipping Serv., Ltd.), 146 N.L.R.B. 723 (1964) (the Board decision
from which the instant case was appealed); Local 5, United Ass'n of Journey-
men Plumbers (Arthur Venneri Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 828 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d
366 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963); Local 825, Int'l Union of Oper-
ating Eng'rs (R. G. Maupa Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 578 (1962), and second, that a refusal
to refer constitutes "restraint or coercion" when accompanied by a resulting hindrance
of the neutral's business with the primary. See Columbus Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council (Kroger Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. No. 117 (Nov. 30, 1964); Local 756, IBEW
(Martin Co.), 131 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1961). See also Local 5, United Ass'n of Journey-
men Plumbers v. NLRB, supra (enforcement of Venneri). The latter approach
seems better as it proscribes only refusals affecting the primary-neutral relationship.
Refusal to refer was one of the loopholes in the secondary boycott provisions of
the act which the 1959 amendments were intended to remedy.
Fourth, the amendment covers the withholding of prospective employees from
a secondary employer. . . . I refer to a case where I may be under a contract
and under an obligation to use the facilities of a hiring hall to get my em-
ployees from the hiring hall. The union would say to me, "We will not
furnish you any more men, so long as you handle the products of that com-
pany." That is another form of secondary boycott which would be prohibited.
105 CO G. REC. 6667 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan), in 2 NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIscLosuRE AcT OF
1959, at 1194 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 LEG. HIST.]. Although this proposed
amendment was defeated, 105 CONG. REc. 6671 (1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIsT. 1198, the
act as finally passed incorporated the substance of the amendment Compare the
amendment as proposed, 105 CONG. REc. 6666 (1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1193, with
the amendment as finally passed, 73 Stat 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B)
(Supp. V, 1964).
37 The court analogized the refusal to refer for work upon a single ship to the
narrow consumer appeal which the Supreme Court held, in NLRB v. Fruit & Vege-
table Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964), not to fall within the ban of § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).
Instant case at 994, 998. In the Fruit & Vegetable case the Court held that a union
could picket the retail outlet of a struck product providing it confined its appeal to
urging consumers not to buy the product The Court construed the section to allow
the questioned activity in the absence of a contrary congressional intent, so as to
avoid first amendment problems involved in the prohibition of picketing. NLRB v.
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material to the legal consequences of the refusal to refer.'8 If the union's
deliberate actions hinder the neutral in doing business with the primary, the
union can be said to be restraining the neutral. In the present case the
neutral, Maryland, notwithstanding the nonexclusive nature of its hiring
hall agreement,19 was severely limited in its access to the use of outside
labor.20 Thus the pressure exerted on the neutral should be characterized
as that "restraint" essential to a section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) violation.2 '
The second elenment of the violation-an object of forcing or requiring
any person to cease doing business with any other person-also appears
in the facts of the present case despite the court's assertion that the cessation
of business was not an object at all, but merely an incidental by-product
of the union's only real object, i.e., the "political" aim of eliminating trade
with Cuba.2 Even given the fact that the ultimate object was to eliminate
Fruit & Vegetable Packers, supra at 63. In the instant case, where there is no con-
suner appeal, this problem is absent. The court here indicated that the union's
activity might be protected by the first amendment because it was essentially political.
Instant case at 999. Yet, if § 8(b) (4)'s regulation of strike activity is not violative
of the first amendment, see NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675 (1951), there seems to be no reason why the section should be inapplicable
in the present case because of the added element of political activity. The Board is
dealing with activity which is more than speech, and hence subject to regulation.
While a strike may be a form of expression, to label it as such tends to be misleading
because it clouds the distinction-inherent in the first amendment-between "expres-
sion" and "action." See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 880-81 (1963). The amendment protects only "expression"; strikes
are "action." Classifying a refusal to refer as protected "expression" would not
further the essential purpose behind the amendment. The Supreme Court, in Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), said: "[T]he basis of the First Amendment
is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda,
free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies." Id. at 503.
18 A "limited" refusal, where the neutral cannot readily obtain labor through
some other source, has the same effect as a "total" refusal. Tactically, of course,
there would be no need for the union to resort to a total refusal.
TD Instant case at 994 n.2. "Permission is given the company to obtain workers
from other sources 'when an insufficient number of men are available under the
hiring procedure set forth . . . ."' The hiring hall agreement was nonexclusive
only in cases where Maryland could not refer. Here they would not refer.
In Columbus Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Kroger Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. No. 117
(Nov. 30, 1964), the Board found a refusal to refer constituted a secondary boycott
even in the absence of a contractual arrangement, if the neutral were dependent upon
such referral.
20 See Penello v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 227 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D.
Md. 1964) (issuance of a temporary injunction pending final adjudication by the
Board in the instant case). On occasion, when Local 1355 failed to supply men, the
neutral would obtain labor from another union. Id. at 166. But that union would
have refused to supply labor according to the Board's opinion. Id. at 169. The
court, however, felt that it was not clear whether another union would have refused.
Instant case at 994. Other problems were also present: "[T]he lack of winchmen
would present a costly problem; and there would have to be greater supervision by
Maryland Ship Ceiling's [the neutral's] superintendent and foremen than is necessary
when the work is done by men drawn from the pool of labor experienced in this
specialized work represented by Local 1355." 227 F. Supp. at 166.
21 See Lesnick, supra note 10, at 1020 n.88; cf. Local 1976, United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 103-08 (1958) ; Local 5, United Ass'n of Journey-
men Plumbers v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921
(1963); Columbus Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Kroger Co.), 149 N.L.R.B.
No. 117 (Nov. 30, 1964).
22 Instant case at 998. The court conceded that cessation of business need be
but at; object to constitute a violation. Ibid. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951).
COMMENTS
trade with Cuba,m it remains true that the ultimate object was to be accom-
plished by a method-which may here be denominated an intermediate
object 24-which forced Maryland to cease doing business with Ocean, at
least insofar as the Tulse Hill was concerned.2
It might be argued that the union's dispute was with Cuba, and that
Ocean was simply a second neutral; but a recent decision has held that
the "other person" involved in the secondary boycott situation may be a
neutral.26 In point of fact, Ocean, which had already agreed to cease
dealing with Cuba,27 might be considered a hybrid. Ocean was a neutral
in the sense that the union's ultimate "cease doing business" object was
directed at Cuba.2 s More relevant here, however, Ocean was a primary
in the sense that it had engaged in conduct-trade with Cuba-which the
union sought to punish through a neutral third party. Thus, for purposes
of applying the terms of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), the union's object should
be viewed as an attempt to induce Maryland to cease doing business with
Ocean.
23
If the working conditions on the ship were unsafe and accordingly the union
refused to refer men to that ship, the refusal would have to be considered primary
activity. Similarly, if the union's object were limited to the desire not to "dirty" its
hands working a "tainted" ship, the resulting cessation of business might arguably be
treated as merely incidental to that object, and the conduct, as primary. But the
object was in fact broader. In a press release issued October 8, 1962, the ILA stated:
"'We feel more stringent action [than is being taken by the United States Govern-
ment] is needed and while the Government's proposals may slightly curb trade with
Red Cuba, we, of the International Longshoremen's Association, intend to eliminate
it." Penello v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 227 F. Supp. 164, 167 (D. Md.
1964). (Emphasis added.)
4 See National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB
v. United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 320 F.2d 250, 254 (1st Cir. 1963).
25The court indicated that other aspects of Maryland's business relations with
Ocean were unaffected. Instant case at 998. However, the Board has held on several
occasions that "something less than a total cancellation of the business connection, is
a 'cease doing business' object within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (B) of the
Act." Local 3, IBEW (New York Tel. Co.), 140 N.L.R.B. 729, 730, enforced, 325
F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1963) ; accord, Alpert v. Local 1066, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,
166 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D. Mass. 1958) ; Retail Clerks Union (Food Employers Council,
Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 307, 309 (1963).
26 National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1965). See also
note 14 stupra.
27 Instant case at 994. This, of course, indicates that the union sought no specific
concession from Ocean. See Lesnick, supra note 10, at 1016-17, for a brief discussion
of the proposition that the absence of a demand may be irrelevant to the finding of
a secondary boycott.
2 8 While Cuba is probably not a "person" within the meaning of § 2(1) of the
act, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1958), it is not necessary
for present purposes that she be a "person," since even though we can consider her
the primary in the sense that she is the ultimate object of the ILA's dissatisfaction,
it is Ocean to whom the immediate "cease doing business" object is directed.
